Summary:
Iran's military strategy in its conflict with Israel and the US is not focused on conventional victory but on survival through deterrence and endurance. It relies on asymmetric tactics, such as deploying low-cost drones and missiles to exhaust expensive enemy defenses, and leverages economic pressure by threatening key oil shipping routes. The strategy also involves striking neighboring states to raise the risks of hosting US forces, though this risks further regional isolation.
Main Topics Covered:
- Iran's asymmetric warfare doctrine (deterrence, endurance, cost-imposition)
- Military capabilities and regional proxy networks
- Economic dimensions of the conflict (energy chokepoints, cost disparities in arms)
- Regional targeting and its diplomatic risks
- Decentralized military command structure
Iran's high-risk war strategy seems to centre on endurance and deterrence
Iran's military posture in a widening conflict with Israel and the US suggests it is not fighting for victory in any conventional sense. It is fighting for survival, and survival on its own terms.
The Islamic Republic's leaders and commanders have been preparing for this moment for years.
They understood that their regional ambitions could eventually trigger a direct confrontation with Israel or the US, and that a war with one would almost certainly draw in the other. That pattern was evident in the 12-day war last summer, when Israel struck first and the US joined days later.
In the current round of fighting, they launched strikes on Iran simultaneously.
Given the technological superiority, intelligence capabilities and advanced military hardware of the US and Israel, it would be naive to think Iranian strategists were planning for a straightforward battlefield victory.
Instead, Iran appears to have built a strategy around deterrence and endurance. It has invested heavily in layered ballistic missile capabilities, long-range drones and a network of allied armed groups across the region over the past decade.
It understands its own limitations: US mainland territory is out of reach but American bases across the region - specifically in neighbouring Arab countries - are not. Israel also lies well within range of Iranian missiles and drones, and recent exchanges have demonstrated that its air defence systems can be penetrated. Each projectile that goes through those systems carries not just military but psychological weight.
Iran's calculus rests partly on the economics of war. Interceptors used by Israel and the US are much more expensive than many of the one-way drones and missiles deployed by Iran. Prolonged conflict forces the US and Israel to use up high-value assets to intercept comparatively low-cost threats.
Energy is another lever in the war economy.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most critical chokepoints for oil and gas shipments. Iran does not need to close the narrow Gulf waterway entirely - even credible threats and limited disruptions have already pushed prices up and, if continued, may increase international pressure for de-escalation.
In this sense, escalation becomes a tool not necessarily to defeat Iran's opponents militarily but instead to raise the cost of continuing the war.
This brings us to attacks on neighbouring countries.
Missile and drone strikes on states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Iraq appear designed to signal that hosting US forces carries risks.
Tehran may hope these governments will press Washington to limit or halt operations - but this is a dangerous gamble. To expand attacks further risks hardening their hostility and pushing these states more firmly into the US-Israel camp.
The long-term consequences could outlast the war itself, reshaping regional alignments in ways that leave Iran more isolated.
If survival is the primary objective, then widening the circle of enemies is a high-stakes move. Yet from Tehran's perspective, restraint may appear equally risky if it signals weakness.
Reports that local commanders may be selecting targets or launching missiles with relative autonomy raises further questions.
If accurate, this would not necessarily indicate the collapse of command structures. Iran's military doctrine, particularly within the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), has long incorporated decentralised elements to ensure continuity under heavy attack.
Communication networks are vulnerable to interception and jamming. Senior commanders have been targeted. Air superiority by the US and Israel limits central oversight. Under such conditions, pre-authorised target lists and delegated launch authority could be deliberate safeguards against decapitation.
This structure may explain how Iranian forces have continued operating after the killing of senior IRGC figures and even after the killing of Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader and commander-in-chief, in the opening US-Israeli strikes on Saturday.
But decentralisation carries risks. Local commanders acting with incomplete information may strike unintended targets, including neighbouring states that had sought neutrality.
The absence of a unified operational picture increases the probability of miscalculation. If this continues for long, it could also result in the loss of command and control.
Ultimately, Iran's approach appears to rest on a belief that it can absorb punishment longer than its adversaries are willing to sustain pain and costs.
If this is the case, then it is a form of calculated escalation: endure, retaliate, avoid total collapse and wait for political fractures to emerge on the other side.
Yet endurance has limits. Missile stockpiles are limited and production lines are constantly under attack. Mobile launchers are targeted on the move and replacing them takes time.
The same logic applies to Iran's opponents.
Israel has not been able to rely completely on its air defence systems. Each breach amplifies public anxiety. The US must weigh regional escalation, energy market volatility and the financial burden of sustained operations.
Both sides seem to assume that time favours them. Both cannot be right.
In this war, the Islamic Republic does not need triumph. It needs to remain standing.
Whether that objective is achievable, and without permanently alienating its neighbours, remains the unanswered question.
Meridiano
